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Abstract
We present exact analytic results for a new version of the Minority
Game (MG) in which strategy performance is recorded over a finite time
horizon. The dynamics of this Time Horizon Minority Game (THMG) ex-
hibit many distinct features from the MG and depend strongly on whether
the participants are fed real, or random, history strings. The THMG equa-
tions are equivalent to a Markov Chain, and yield exact analytic results
for the volatility given a specific realization for the quenched strategy
disorder.
1 Introduction
Agent-based models of complex adaptive systems are attracting significant in-
terest across many disciplines[1]. Typically each agent has access to a limited set
of recent global outcomes of the system; she then combines this information with
her limited strategy set chosen randomly at the start of the game (i.e. quenched
disorder) in order to decide an action at a given timestep. These decisions by
the N agents feed back to generate the fluctuations in the system’s output. The
Minority Game (MG) introduced by Challet and Zhang[2, 3] offers possibly the
simplest paradigm for such a complex, adaptive system and has therefore been
the subject of intense research activity [1]-[9]. Most studies of the MG have
focussed on a calculation of both time and configuration (i.e. quenched disor-
der) averaged quantities, in particular the ‘volatility’ σ where σ is the standard
deviation of the fluctuations. Our own work has shown that the variations of
this averaged σ with memory size m can be quantitatively explained in terms
of ‘crowd-anticrowd’ collective behavior [5, 6]. This crowd-anticrowd theory,
which implicitly assumes both time-averaging and configuration-averaging, is
simple and intuitive yet it yields useful analytic expressions [5, 6]. In terms of
more detailed microscopic theories, two complementary spin-glass approaches
have been shown to be remarkably powerful[2, 9].
In this paper, we wish to focus on the dynamics of the multi-agent game for
a given realization of the quenched disorder of initially picked strategies. We
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present exact analytic results for a finite time horizon version of the Minority
Game, the Time Horizon Minority Game (THMG), in which strategy perfor-
mance is only recorded over the previous τ timesteps. This seemingly trivial
modification of the basic MG yields a dynamical system with surprisingly rich
dynamics. These dynamics depend strongly on whether the participants are fed
real (as opposed to random) history strings, and on the nature of the quenched
disorder corresponding to initial conditions. We present a set of equations de-
scribing the THMG - these equations are equivalent to a Markov Chain. This
Markov Chain is used to generate accurate analytic results for the resulting
volatility in the THMG. Throughout the paper, similarities and differences be-
tween the THMG and MG are pointed out where appropriate. Section 2 provides
a brief introduction to the MG and provides exact analytic expressions for the
volatility σ for a given configuration of quenched disorder. Section 3 discusses
the THMG and provides corresponding formulae for this game. Section 4 com-
pares the analytic and numerical results for the THMG. Section 5 provides the
conclusion.
2 The basic Minority Game (MG)
The MG [1, 2] comprises an odd number of agents N (e.g. traders or drivers)
choosing repeatedly between option 0 (e.g. buy or choose route 0) and option 1
(e.g. sell or choose route 1). The winners are those in the minority group; e.g.
sellers win if there is an excess of buyers, drivers choosing route 0 encounter
less traffic if most other drivers choose route 1. The outcome at each timestep
represents the winning decision, 0 or 1. A common bit-string of the m most
recent outcomes is made available to the agents at each timestep [8]. The
agents randomly pick s strategies at the beginning of the game, with repetitions
allowed (quenched disorder). Each strategy is a bit-string of length 2m which
predicts the next outcome for each of the 2m possible histories. After each turn,
the agent assigns one (virtual) point to each of her strategies which would have
predicted the correct outcome, and penalizes a strategy by one (virtual) point
if it incorrectly predicts the outcome. At each turn of the game, the agent uses
the most successful strategy, i.e. the one with the most virtual points, among
her s strategies.
The number of agents holding a particular combination of strategies can
be written as a D × D × . . . (s terms) dimensional tensor Ω, where D is the
total number of available strategies. For s = 2, this is simply a D ×D matrix
where the entry (i, j) represents the number of agents who picked strategy i
and then j. The strategy labels are given by the decimal representation of
the strategy plus unity, for example the strategy 0101 for m = 2 has strategy
label 5+1=6. This quenched disorder Ω is fixed at the beginning of the game
and can be written using the full or reduced strategy spaces [2]. The value of
aµR [2] describes the prediction of strategy R given the history µ, where µ is
the decimal number corresponding to the m-bit binary history string. Hence
aµR = −1 denotes a prediction of choice ‘0’ while a
µ
R = 1 denotes a prediction
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of choice ‘1’). The approach of our (time and configuration-averaged) crowd-
anticrowd theory was to partition the N agents into g groups in such a way that
the groups themselves were uncorrelated. This was achieved by considering the
reduced strategy space, which produces essentially identical results to the full
strategy space for the volatility. Specifically, each group g contains a crowd of nCg
agents using highly correlated strategies, and an anticrowd nAg of agents using
strategies which are highly anti-correlated to the crowd. This leaves an effective
super-agent of size ng = n
C
g − n
A
g representing each group. Since the strong
correlations have now been removed from the problem, the resulting groups are
essentially uncorrelated and can be considered as executing random walks with
respect to each other in terms of their decisions. As shown in Refs. [5, 6],
summing the resulting variances yields excellent agreement with the numerical
values for the volatility 〈〈σ〉〉Ω, where 〈〈. . . 〉〉Ω denotes averaging over all initial
configurations of quenched disorder {Ω}.
Here we are interested instead in the detailed dynamics of the game for a
given choice of initial quenched disorder Ω, hence we follow a more microscopic
approach. This is particularly relevant if the intended application of such games
is to understand financial markets, since such markets should each correspond
to just one realization of the game given an initial Ω. Hence we imagine that
a particular Ω has already been chosen. Since the game involves a coin-toss to
break ties in strategy scores, this stochasticity also means that different runs for
a given Ω will also differ - we return to this point below. The number of traders
making decision 1 (the ‘instantaneous crowd’) minus the number of traders
making decision 0 (the ‘instantaneous anticrowd’) defines the net ‘attendance’
A[t] at a given timestep t of the game. This attendance A[t] is made up of two
groups of traders at any one timestep: there are AD[t] traders who act in a
‘decided’ way, i.e. they do not require the toss of a coin to decide which choice
to make - this is because they have one strategy that is better than their others,
or because their highest-scoring strategies are tied but give the same response
as each other to the history µt at that turn of the game. In addition, there
are AU [t] traders who act in an ‘undecided’ way, i.e. they require the toss of a
coin to decide which choice to make - this is because they have two (or more)
highest-scoring tied strategies and these give different responses to the history
µt at that turn of the game. Hence the outcome at timestep t is given by
A[t] = AD[t] +AU [t] . (1)
The state of the game at the beginning of timestep t depends on the strategy
score vector st and a history µt at that moment. Henceforth we will drop
the variable t from the notation, but note that it remains an implicit variable
through the time-dependence of s and µ. We also focus on s = 2 strategies per
agent, although the formalism can be generalized in a straightforward way. At
timestep t, AD is given exactly by
AD(s, µ) =
∑
R,R′=1
aµR(1 + Sgn[sR − sR′ ])ΨR,R′ (2)
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where the symmetrized matrix Ψ = 12 (Ω+Ω
T ) with Ω representing the quenched
disorder. The element Ω
R,R′
gives the number of agents picking strategy R and
then R′. The number of undecided traders NU is given exactly by
NU (s, µ) =
∑
R,R′=1
δ(sR − sR′ )[1− δ(a
µ
R − a
µ
R′
)]Ω
R,R′
(3)
and hence the attendance of undecided traders AU is distributed binomially in
the following way:
AU (s, µ) ≡ 2 Bin[NU (s, µ),
1
2
]−NU (s, µ) (4)
where the term ‘Bin’ denotes a binomial distribution with NU (s, µ) trials and
probability 1/2.
The so-called ‘volatility’ is used in finance to describe some statistical char-
acteristic of the fluctuations in the market. It does not have a unique definition
in the finance literature but is typically taken as some form of ‘root-mean-
square’ fluctuation - however this definition leaves open the question of which
mean should be computed. In the present context, it makes sense to define the
volatility in terms of the time-average of a particular realization k of the ran-
dom process A[t], given an initial quenched disorder Ω. As mentioned above,
our crowd-anticrowd theory was limited to consideration of a time-averaged
volatility 〈〈σ〉〉Ω which had also been averaged over all configurations of initial
quenched disorder {Ω}. The present work goes beyond this limitation to consid-
eration of a particular choice of quenched disorder Ω. Consider any stochastic
process z(t) produced by a particular realization k of the game, given an initial
quenched disorder Ω. This quantity z(t) could represent the attendance A[t] at
timestep t, or any time-dependent quantity derived from it such as the mean
attendance at timestep t calculated over the past n timesteps, or the volatility
defined as the root-mean-square attendance over the past n timesteps. The
finite time average of the k’th realization of this process is given by
[(k)z(t)]T ≡
1
T
∫ t+T/2
t−T/2
(k)z(t′)dt′ . (5)
If T is finite, then [(k)z(t)]T is itself a random process. In real financial markets,
the volatility defined by such a finite-time average does indeed fluctuate pro-
ducing ‘volatility clustering’. Here we instead wish to focus on the time-average
which is defined in the T →∞ limit:
(k)z ≡ Lim T→∞
1
T
∫ t+T/2
t−T/2
(k)z(t′)dt′ , (6)
which no longer depends on t or T but in general does depend on the particular
realization k of the ensemble that we have chosen in addition to the dependence
on the initial quenched disorder Ω. In the absence of stochastic tie-breaks,
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the attendance A[t] would be deterministic hence producing a deterministic
Minority Game for a given initial quenched disorder Ω [10]. However in the
presence of stochastic tie-breaks, which is the case of interest here, the game
should self-average in the following sense: for a given quenched disorder Ω,
the time-average of A[t] or any of its higher order correlation functions (e.g.
volatility) for a given realization k should be equivalent to the ensemble average
value taken over all realizations k at a given time t. We stress that this discussion
is for one particular (fixed ) quenched disorder Ω - we are not averaging over
this quenched disorder. Henceforth we will therefore assume that this ergodic
principle holds given a particular Ω, i.e. we assume that the time-average and
ensemble-average of both the attendance A[t] and the volatility are equivalent
for fixed quenched disorder Ω. We will denote this average attendance as A
and the associated average volatility as σ, noting that both have an implicit
dependence on the initial quenched disorder Ω. Hence for a given Ω, the square
of the volatility is given exactly by the expectation value of the mean-square
attendance:
σ2 =
∑
A
(A−A)2P (A) (7)
where P (A) is the probability that the attendance is given by A. From Eq.
(1) the attendance A = AD(s, µ) + AU (s, µ, x) where we have included the
stochastic variable x to denote the coin-toss process. Because this coin-toss
process is unbiased, we have AU (s, µ, x) = 0 and hence A = AD(s, µ). The
probability P (A) is exactly equivalent to the probability of obtaining a given s,
µ and x. Since x is an independent variable, we have
P (A) = P (µ|s)P (s)P (x) (8)
with P (x) given by the binomial expression NUCx(
1
2 )
NU . Here P (s) is the
probability that the strategy score vector is s, while P (µ | s) is the probability
that the game is in a state where the history is µ given that the strategy score
vector is s. Hence Eq. (7) can be rewritten exactly as
σ2 =
∑
{s}
[∑
{µ}
[ NU∑
x=0
[
NUCx(
1
2
)NU (AD + 2x−NU −A)
2
]
P (µ | s)
]
P (s)
]
(9)
with the mean attendance being given exactly by
A =
∑
{s}
[∑
{µ}
[
AD P (µ | s)
]
P (s)
]
(10)
where in Eqs. (9) and (10) AD = AD(s, µ) and NU = NU (s, µ). The difficulty
in evaluating this expression for the volatility in the MG, for a given quenched
disorder Ω, now lies in the complexity of P (s) and P (µ | s). As an example of a
specific realization of the initial quenched disorder, we shall take Ω throughout
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this paper to be the following randomly-chosen matrix in the reduced strategy
space:
Ω =


1 2 1 0 1 1 1 1
0 0 2 2 2 0 2 0
2 1 0 3 1 0 2 1
2 2 0 3 3 2 2 2
1 1 0 2 3 3 2 0
2 3 2 0 1 5 1 1
0 1 4 7 2 1 0 0
3 2 2 0 2 2 2 4


. (11)
Figure 1 shows the resulting P (s) for N = 101, m = 2, s = 2 and Ω as
shown above. The strategy scores themselves are written out explicitly for the
dominant score vectors. As can be seen, the probability distribution P (s) is
uneven and has non-trivial structure.
3 Time Horizon Minority Game (THMG)
In the basic MG, strategy scores are kept since the beginning of the game. One
might ask whether this is realistic in a ‘real-world’ situation, given the finite
time-horizon under which most ‘agents’ (e.g. traders) tend to operate. Hence
we will make a small modification to this rule - we introduce the Time Horizon
Minority Game (THMG) in which strategy scores are only kept over the last
τ turns of the game. Hence agents (e.g. traders) are limited to assessing their
strategies’ performance over the last τ turns of the game, in addition to the
basic MG rule of viewing just the last m steps of the history. We focus on the
low m regime because of the richer dynamics, however our formalism applies for
all m.
Figure 2 shows numerical results for the variation in volatility as a function
of τ , given different realizations of the initial quenched disorder Ω. Results are
shown for m = 3 using the full strategy space, and for both real and random
histories of the game. For real histories it can be seen that the volatility is
essentially periodic in 2.2m. This value corresponds to the number of different
paths in a De Bruijn graph linking all P = 2m histories. Such a graph is
necessarily Eulerian since all the vertex-degrees of a De Bruijn graph are even.
Games that differ in τ by multiples of 2.2m show similar dynamics for t > τ .
The dynamics of the THMG for t < τ are that of the basic MG, as can be seen
in Figs. 3a and 3b for small t.
The peaks in Fig. 2 which arise at τ = 2.2mλ − 1 for real histories, where
λ ≥ 1 and is an integer, correspond to realizations of the game that are purely
deterministic. If the game performs a path around the de Bruijn graph that is
of a length τ and satisfies the condition that all edges have been visited equally
during the course of this path, then s and µ at the start of the cycle are identical
to s and µ at the end of the cycle, i.e. ∆scycle = 0 and ∆µcycle = 0. Note that
even for large λ this is very likely to happen due to the nature of the minority
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game in the efficient regime [10]. In the THMG it is observed to occur very
soon after t becomes larger than τ . Once this type of path occurs for integer
λ, the game evolves such that sµ is equal to ±aµ at any subsequent time-step
of the game. Note that for integer λ the strategies are scored for one time-step
less than the period of this special cycle; this fact together with ∆scycle = 0
and ∆µcycle = 0 imply that s
µ = ±aµ. When sµ = ±aµ, we are left with the
unique situation where all tied strategies that have a particular score at history
µ give the same game decision, i.e. +1 or −1. When this happens there are
no longer any traders that have tied strategies telling them to make opposing
decisions. None of the game dynamics for this turn of the game are therefore
decided by the tossing of coins - this turn is hence purely deterministic. Once
the game has found such a deterministic state, it never leaves it and the game
henceforth evolves such that sµ = ±aµ. Figure 3a shows the finite time-average
standard deviation (over 100 turns) of the attendance, together with the actual
number of traders making a given decision as a function of time. The case shown
corresponds to λ = 100 and hence τ = 1599. For time-steps 0 to 1599 the system
is equivalent to that of the basic MG, whereas from t = 1600 onwards the effect
of the time horizon on strategy scores becomes apparent. The system only takes
about 40 time-steps to become locked into the deterministic state described
above. We have observed at low m and for several randomly selected Ω, that
once t becomes larger than τ then the game rapidly finds the deterministic state
described above. The game dynamics hence become deterministic and periodic
with period τ + 1. It is possible to construct specially chosen Ω matrices such
that the above special cycle is not found during a run of the corresponding game,
however we are here interested in characterising the dynamics for a ‘typical’ (i.e.
randomly chosen) Ω. Figure 3b shows the corresponding results for τ = 1600.
We stress that the THMG with random histories has very different dynamics as
can be seen in Fig. 2.
We now present an analytic description of the THMG. Consider τ + 1 con-
secutive histories in the game and call this a µ-path, denoted as µpath.We define
G as the matrix telling us which transitions between histories are allowed in the
game - the matrix G is the P × P ‘adjacency’ matrix of a de Bruijn graph of
order m. The element G
µ,ν
has value 1 if history ν can follow history µ in the
game, but has value 0 if the transition is disallowed. The adjacency matrix is
hence given by
G
µ,ν
= δ(2µ%P − ν) + δ(2µ%P + 1− ν) (12)
where A%B is the remainder when A is divided by B. Here µ and ν denote the
nodes (i.e. histories) in the de Bruijn graph where µ, ν = 0, 1, ... The matrix G
quantifies which paths around history space are allowed and hence we can write
down a rule for determining which µpath transitions are permitted in the game.
Let µpath(t−1) = µt−τ−1 → µt−τ → ...µt−1. Whether µpath(t−1) actually arises
in the game, and whether the transition to µpath(t) = µt−τ → µt−τ+1 → ...µt
is allowed, depends on whether all the transitions are allowed between histories
in µpath(t − 1) and the corresponding history in µpath(t). Figure 4 shows an
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example of the allowed transitions between µ-paths for m = 2, τ = 2. Let us
define a scalar quantity Γ given by
Γ =
τ∏
i=0
G
µt−1−i,µt−i
. (13)
The transition between µpath(t − 1) and µpath(t) is allowed if Γ = 1, but is
disallowed if Γ = 0. The increment in score vector when passing from one
history at time-step t− 1 to the next history at time-step t is given by
δsµt−1→µt = (2a
µt−1 − 1)(2(µt%2)− 1) (14)
It follows that
sµpath =
τ−1∑
i=0
δsµt−1−i→µt−i . (15)
We can evaluate the exact number of decided and undecided traders for a
given µpath, and we can also identity which µpath are allowed in the game; hence
we can find the transition matrix giving the probability that a particular µpath
at an arbitrary timestep evolves to the next allowed µpath with final history µt.
This transition matrix is given as follows:
T
µpath(t−1),µpath(t)
=
NU∑
x=0
[
NUCx(
1
2
)NU δ
[
Sgn(AD + 2x−NU )
+ (2(µt%2)− 1)
]]
(16)
where AD = AD(µpath(t− 1)) = AD(sµpath(t−1), µt−1) and NU = NU (µpath(t−
1)) = NU (sµpath(t−1), µt−1). The size of T is given by φ = 2
(m+τ). For the
basic MG φ would grow indefinitely with time t, however for the THMG it
is of fixed size. Having obtained this transition matrix for the THMG then
allows us to calculate various macroscopic quantities, in particular P (µpath).
The vector P (µpath) satisfies P (µpath) = P (µpath)T which is the transpose of
an eigenvector-eigenvalue equation. The vector P (µpath) is also a stationary
distribution of the Markov Chain:
P (µpath) = [φ
−11 T∞]µpath . (17)
The expression given for P (µpath) represents an average over all games with
different µ-paths defining the initial conditions of the game. This is achieved by
taking an average over all φ rows of the matrix T∞. This method assumes that,
for all possible states in the set {µpath}, if a state is visited then the state can be
re-visited during a run of the game. We note that if there are closed irreducible
subsets in the set of µ-paths {µpath} which are visited during the time evolution
of the THMG, the game can then lock into a deterministic state. This situation
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of deterministic states arises for τ = 2.2mλ − 1 as discussed earlier. In this
case, the present method for calculating P (µpath) could be improved to account
more fully for the deterministic dynamics since in general the system is not
ergodic We do not consider such a calculation here, but note that the values of
σ obtained using the present method may still be very accurate (see later Fig.
6 for τ = 7 for example).
Figure 5a shows the measured P (µpath) for N = 101, m = 2, s = 2, Ω as
in Eq. (11) and τ = 2. Figure 5b shows the corresponding calculated P (µpath)
using Eq. (13). The agreement is excellent, demonstrating that our expression
for P (µpath) is exact.
4 Results
We now show how to calculate the volatility of the THMG exactly using Eq.
(9). Without loss of generality, we replace both P (s) and P (µ | s) by the
probability P (µpath) that the game has just passed through one particular µpath
at a timestep t. This reduces the problem of calculating the volatility σ in the
THMG to that of studying a Markov Chain whose states are given by the set
{µpath}. Note that whilst the THMG is homogeneous, the basic MG is not
since the size of the set {µpath} grows as t increases. Replacing both P (s) and
P (µ | s) by the probability P (µpath) in Eq. (9), we have an equivalent exact
expression for σ given by :
σ2 =
∑
{µpath}
[ NU∑
x=0
[
NUCx(
1
2
)NU (AD + 2x−NU −A)
2
]
P (µpath)
]
. (18)
In order to calculate AD and NU exactly for a given µpath, the score vector
to be used is that which would be obtained if the game went through a path
of histories corresponding to µpath as in Eq. (15); the history to be used is
the last history in the path µpath. Denoting this last history as µ, we have
AD = AD(µpath) = AD(sµpath , µ) and NU = NU (µpath) = NU (sµpath , µ). We
note that the exact analytic expression given for σ in Eq. (18) applies to the
limiting case where the number of realizations used to numerically determine σ
tends to infinity (i.e. ensemble average). We also note that using the formalism
described, we could alternatively have obtained a finite time-average volatility
σ between t = t1 and t = t2 given a specific µpath at t = t1.
Using Eq. (17) in Eq. (18), together with Eqs. (2), (3) and (10), we
obtain analytic values for σ in the THMG given the initial quenched disorder
Ω. Figure 6 shows a comparison between the analytic values for the volatility σ
and the numerical values taken from the game as a function of the time-horizon
τ . Here N = 101, m = 2, s = 2, and Ω is given in Eq. (11). We only show
τ = 1 → 2.2m + 1, i.e. λ = 1; however similar results can also be obtained
for λ > 1. The agreement is excellent, with the numerical and analytic lines
essentially coincident. This demonstrates the power and accuracy of the present
Markov Chain formalism as developed for the THMG.
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5 Conclusion
In summary, we have introduced and studied a finite time horizon version of
the Minority Game (THMG). We have presented exact analytic expressions for
the volatility in both the THMG and the basic MG, for a given configuration of
initial quenched disorder Ω. We have presented an analytic theory to describe
the dynamics of the THMG by obtaining an analytic expression for the transi-
tion matrix in terms of the set {µpath}. As an example of what can be achieved
analytically, we obtained excellent agreement between analytic and numerical
values for the THMG volatility, given knowledge of the initial quenched disor-
der Ω. Finally we would like to stress that our theoretical approach and results
avoid having to keep track of the labels of individual agents - our results are ob-
tained for a specific initial quenched disorder Ω, however this Ω describes many
possible arrangements of individual agents. In this sense, Ω defines a macrostate
for which there are many possible microstates corresponding to different initial
strategy choices by the N individual agents.
We thank Pak Ming Hui for discussions.
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FIG. 1. The probability of occurrence P (s) of the strategy score vector
obtained numerically from the Minority Game (MG). Strategy score vectors s
are listed in an arbritary order along the x-axis. Unless otherwise stated, the
game parameters in Figs. 1-6 are as follows: N = 101, m = 2, s = 2 with the
initial quenched disorder matrix Ω taken from Eq. (11).
FIG. 2. Standard deviation (volatility) σ as a function of time horizon τ
for the Time Horizon Minority Game (THMG) with m = 3. Results are ob-
tained using the full strategy space. Numerical data is collected using real his-
tories (black circles) and random histories (grey circles) with randomly selected
quenched disorder matrices Ω. The lower short-dashed line shows the value of
the volatility for the basic MG in the high m limit. The upper long-dashed line
shows the configuration-average volatility (i.e. average over quenched disorder
Ω) for the basic MG with m = 3.
FIG. 3. The finite time-average standard deviation (average taken over 100
turns) of the attendance of traders (black line) together with the number of
traders choosing ‘1’ (grey circles) as a function of time t. (a) λ = 100, i.e.
τ = 1599. (b) τ = 1600.
FIG. 4. Schematic diagram showing the allowed transitions between µ-paths
in the THMG for the following example: µpath(t − 1) = 2 → 0 → 1 and
m = 2, τ = 2.
FIG. 5. (a) Numerical and (b) analytic results for the probability distribution
P (µpath) as a function of µpath. µ-path are listed in order of increasing decimal
representation along the x-axis. Game parameters are N = 101, m = 2, s = 2,
Ω as in Eq. (11), and τ = 2.
FIG. 6. Standard deviation (volatility) σ for the THMG as a function of
time horizon τ , for a given initial quenched disorder Ω. Exact analytic values
are grey diamonds joined by a thick grey dashed line, numerical values taken
from the game simulation are black circles joined by a thick black line. These
lines are essentially coincident thereby demonstrating the excellent agreement
between the analytic theory and the numerical results. Here N = 101, m = 2,
s = 2, and Ω is from Eq. (11). Lower short-dashed line shows the value of the
volatility for the basic MG in the high m limit. Upper long-dashed line shows
the configuration-average volatility (i.e. average over quenched disorder Ω) for
the basic MG with m = 2.
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